Japan's trade and FDI policies in the first decade of the 21st century. Facts and probably trends by Hernadi, Andras
  
 
INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMICS 
 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
 
W o r k i n g  P a p e r s 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 152                   March 2005 
 
András Hernádi 
 
JAPAN’S TRADE AND FDI POLICIES 
IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY  
FACTS AND PROBABLE TRENDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1014 Budapest, Orszagház u. 30. 
Tel.: (36-1) 224-6760 • Fax: (36-1) 224-6761 • E-mail: vki@vki.hu
 SUMMARY 
The impact of the Asian crisis in 1997–8 
on Japan, was relatively great as the 
country had already gone through a 
decade of stagnation. Yet the author* 
has argued before, that this was no ‘lost 
decade’ but a period of transformation, 
leading to further internationalization 
(globalization) of the economy and soci-
ety. 
Before making predictions about the 
future in Japan’s external economic poli-
cies, it is advisable to study some basic 
historical trends. Japan’s share of world 
exports eased considerably in the last 
decade, while those of the United States 
and the EU decreased much less. The 
only country surveyed where the import 
share grew was the United States. It vir-
tually stagnated in the EU and lost rela-
tive weight in Japan. Japan suffered a 
huge loss of international position in FDI 
exports in 1990–2003 while its main ri-
vals retained or increased shares that 
were twice to four times as great ini-
tially. The relative weight of Japan’s in-
ward stock doubled, but remained mod-
est compared with its competitors, whose 
shares did not change significantly 
Although Japan’s share of global 
trade decreased, it managed to retain its 
huge export surplus throughout the pe-
riod under review. Its trade surplus be-
tween 1996 and 2003 was never less 
than USD 50 billion and in most years 
                                                 
* András Hernádi, senior research fellow and 
director of the Japan, East and Southeast Asia 
Research Centre, Institute for World Economics, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Thanks are due 
to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 
for a research fellowship allowing the author to 
exchange views on related subjects with Japanese 
scholars in September 26–October 15, 2004. Spe-
cial thanks go to Ritsumeikan University and Pro-
fessors Hiroshi Tanaka and Kazuo Inaba for 
hospitality and help. 
reached or even surpassed USD 100 bil-
lion. These annual surpluses represented 
15–30 per cent of its exports.  
Japan’s annual exports of FDI rose 
from the USD 23–26 billion range in the 
second half of the 1990s to USD 32–38 
billion. Western Europe has consistently 
held the greatest share since 1999, while 
Asia has also surpassed the United 
States. The trends reflect Japan’s endeav-
ours to moderate its dependence on the 
United States, in favour of neighbouring 
Asian countries and the third pole, 
Western Europe or the EU. 
Japan’s social and economic 
changes in the last decade were parts of 
a transformation process, bringing it in-
creasingly into line with international 
macro development and micro business 
models, without losing its precious cul-
tural and other traditions. There had 
been earlier efforts to cut back state in-
tervention in the economy, notably dur-
ing the premierships of Yasuhiro Naka-
sone in the 1980s, when ‘planning’ was 
almost erased from the vocabulary of 
economic policy-making. But by the end 
of the 1990s, there were more telling 
signs of this. 
As foreign investors become more 
prominent in industry and domestic 
trade and market forces spread through 
the financial sector, the scope for admin-
istrative intervention or ‘guidance’ has 
narrowed. Even Keidanren, the organiza-
tion that acts as spokesman for the big-
gest corporations, plays a much smaller 
role than it did. One possible explanation 
for all this may be the advance of the 
so-called IT revolution. The number of 
‘scenarios’ and ‘visions’ put forward by 
the public sector has decreased consid-
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erably, while initiatives in this field by 
the private sector have become stronger. 
The Japanese economy will have a 
growing need for foreign investors, not 
because of shortage of capital – the 
country has huge foreign-exchange re-
serves – but for the beneficial effects of 
new competitors and the transfer of for-
eign management methods. Here, how-
ever, the Japanese External Trade Or-
ganization (JETRO) comments self-critically, 
‘Japan must develop the type of domestic 
environment that attracts foreign capital 
and human resources.’ This certainly re-
lates to the methods of Japanese gov-
ernment. 
Japan has been asserting its global 
interests mainly through GATT and then 
WTO membership. In a tripolar world 
economy, however, Japan has developed 
a stronger interest in regional coopera-
tion schemes, such as ASEAN, PAFTA, APEC, 
the EAEC, PECC and AFTA, although it 
continues to emphasize its preference for 
‘open’ as opposed to ‘bloc-type’ regional-
ism. In view of the failure or limited 
success of such schemes, Japan began at 
the end of the 1990s to turn to other 
means such as bilateral free-trade 
agreements. 
In a peculiar way, the Japanese 
government has been continuously influ-
enced in the same direction by the in-
flexibly protectionist behaviour of domes-
tic business circles. Its policy considera-
tion was to confront them, especially the 
agricultural lobby, with huge Japanese 
manufacturing corporations and trading 
houses operating on a global scale, 
which would have strong interests in free 
trade and in keeping up with rivals. For 
these mainly transnational companies 
have realized that processes towards re-
gionalism in the world (such as NAFTA in 
North America and the EU in Europe) 
may crowd them out of significant com-
modity and capital markets or face them 
with latecomers’ disadvantages. FTAs, on 
the other hand, have pressed competition 
on Japan and so given momentum to 
domestic structural changes continually 
called for in business at home and 
abroad. At the same time, priority is 
clearly being given to neighbouring East 
and Southeast Asian countries in the se-
quence of agreements being concluded. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The paper begins by illustrating with 
hard, statistical and soft, survey data 
where Japan and its competitiveness 
stand compared with the other two poles 
of the world economy: the United States 
and the European Union (I). It goes on 
to recapitulate the main trends in Japan’s 
foreign trade and FDI flows up to the 
present day (II), before considering the 
likely trends in Japan’s external economic 
policies (III). It ends with some conclu-
sions on the future of Japan’s economic 
partnership and free-trade agreements 
(IV). 
 
1) JAPAN IN TODAY’S WORLD 
ECONOMY 
Per capita GDP data for 2003, measured 
at current prices and exchange rates, 
reveals a clear hegemony in the world 
economy of the United States, although 
Japan and the three largest EU members 
(Germany, France, and the UK) came 
quite close. While the total GDP of the 
EU 25 was almost identical with that of 
the United States, its greater population 
made the EU per capita figure much 
lower, whereas Japan’s was only 10 per 
cent less (Table 1). When purchasing-
power parity (PPP) data are compared, 
the United States is still in the vanguard 
of the world and its position in relation 
to Japan becomes another 15 percentage 
points better (Table 2). 
Table 1 
A comparison of GDP, population and 
GDP per capita in selected developed coun-
tries, USD, current prices and exchange 
rates, 2003 
 
 
GDP, USD 
billion 
Population, 
millions 
GDP p.c., 
USD thou-
sands 
United States 10895.5 291 37,440 
EU 25  10930.5 455 24,020 
   Germany   2405.9 82 29,340 
   France   1752.1 60 29,200 
   UK   1786.0 59 30,270 
Japan   4302.1 128 33,610 
Sources: Author’s compilation and calculations 
based on IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 
2004; IMF International Financial Statistics Year-
book, 2003; ECB Statistics Pocket Book, July 
2004. 
 
Table 1 
GDP, population and GDP per capita 
in selected developed countries, 
USD, PPP, 2003 
 
 GDP, USD 
billion 
Population, 
millions 
GDP p.c., 
USD thou-
sands 
United States 10,628 291 36,520 
EU 25  11,306 455 24,850 
   Germany   
2,234 
82 27,240 
   France   1,603 60 26,720 
   UK   1,583 59 26,830 
Japan   3,518 128 27,480 
Sources: As Table 1. 
 
The media in 1997–8 was awash 
with news of an Asian crisis. Front-page 
news tends to exaggerate. In this case, it 
would have been closer to the truth to 
speak of a crisis in Southeast Asia,1 for 
                                                 
1 The author and colleagues  argued  this in 
Annamária Artner, Zoltán Bassa, András Hernádi 
and Klára Mészáros (2000), ‘The Far Eastern 
region: moving beyond an atmosphere of crisis’. 
Journal of East Asian Affairs XIV:2, 2000. See 
also Annamária Artner, Zoltán Bassa, András 
Hernádi, Klára Mészáros and András Székely-
Doby (2003), Far Eastern responses to globaliza-
tion, Working Papers 138. Budapest: Institute for 
World Economics (IWE). 
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it was far from general. China and India 
were practically unaffected, and other 
strongly ‘regulated’, smaller economies 
felt some limited impacts. Even the coun-
tries hardest hit, such as South Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, over-
came the crisis in a couple of years, re-
turning to a growth path faster than the 
rest of the world’s, and even more im-
portantly, reappearing on their main ex-
port markets (Table 3). 
On Japan, the impact was relatively 
greater as the country had already gone 
through a decade of stagnation. Yet the 
author has argued before,2 that this was 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Hernádi, András (2001), ‘Cri-
sis or transformation? Japan viewed from Hun-
gary’. In: Hernádi, András, and Makoto Tanigu-
chi, Japan and Asia in a new global age. Work-
ing Papers 114. Budapest: IWE. 
no ‘lost decade’ but a period of trans-
formation, leading to further internation-
alization (globalization) of the economy 
and society. Even growth rates had 
started to ‘normalize’ by 2003 and 
2004.3 
Table 4 illustrates global positions 
in exports and imports. The former can 
also be considered as a dimension of 
international competitiveness, while the 
latter reflect a country’s absorption ca-
pacity for consumption, 
and perhaps more impor-
tantly, its readiness to in-
vest or efforts at further 
development. As the table 
shows, the United States is 
the one country consid-
ered here that spent con-
siderably more on imports 
than it earned by exports, 
thus contributing to one 
of its twin deficits. The 
EU 15 kept its leading 
trading position in the 
world, although Germany 
was the only one of its 
three biggest members to 
export more than either 
of the two leading Asian 
economies, Japan and the 
People’s Republic of 
China.4 (The People’s Re-
public was already a big-
ger importer than Ger-
many in 2003.) 
                                                 
3 GDP forecasts for Japan for 2004 range be-
tween 3 and 4.5 per cent. 
4 The People’s Republic of China appears under 
two headings in Table 4: Mainland China and 
Hong Kong. The data should be added to show 
the People’s Republic’s trading positions. 
Table 3 
GDP real growth rates in Asia (15), the World, the United 
States and the EU, 1996–2003 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Japan 3.5 1.8 -1.1 0.7 2.4 -0.6 1.2 2.7 
People’s China 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.3 6.7 9.1 
India 7.8 4.8 6.5 6.1 4.4 5.6 4.7 8.1 
South Korea 6.7 5.0 -6.7 10.9 9.3 3.1 6.3 3.1 
Taiwana 5.7 6.8 4.8 5.7 6.0 -1.9 2.6 3.2 
Brunei NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Cambodia NA NA NA NA 5.4 5.5 5.5p 5.0t
Indonesia 7.8 4.7 -13.1 0.8 4.9 3.3 3.7p 4.1 
Laos 6.9 6.9 4.0 7.3 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.9t
Malaysia 10.0 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.3 0.4 -0.7 5.2 
Myanmar 6.4 5.7 5.8 10.9 6.2 10.5 5.3p 5.1t 
Philippines 5.8 5.2 -0.6 3.4 4.0 3.4 4.4p 4.5 
Singapore 7.7 8.5 -0.1 6.9 10.3 -2.4 2.2 1.1 
Thailand 5.9 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.6 1.8 5.4 6.7 
Vietnam 9.3 8.2 5.8 4.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.2t
World 4.4 4.2 2.6 3.5 4.5 1.6 1.7 2.5p
United States 2.8 3.3 2.8 3.3 3.4 0.8 1.7 3.1p
EUx 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.1 0.8 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2003 (for 
1996-2002) and IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2004 (for 
2003). For the EU: ECB Statistics Pocket Book. For Cambodia (all 
years), Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (for 2003): UN ESCAP Economic 
and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, various issues. To avoid 
inflation impact and exchange-rate fluctuations, figures are based on 
GDP data in national currencies at constant (1995) prices. Sources for 
1996–9: UN ESCAP, Ibid. For 2000-2002: Deutsche Bank Research 
(www.dbresearch.de). p) Preliminary estimate. t) Forecast/target. 
Source: UN ESCAP, Ibid. x) 1996–2000: average. 
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Table 5 shows overall rankings of 
the same countries for world competi-
tiveness in 2000 and 2004. The United 
States kept its top position, but the other 
highly developed countries under discus-
sion lost competitiveness. Only Mainland 
China and Hong Kong improved their 
positions. 
 
Table 5 
World competitiveness rankings of selected 
countries, 2000 and 2004 
 
 2000 2004 
United States 1 1 
Germany 8 21 
UK 15 22 
France 19 30 
Japan 17 23 
Hong Kong 14 6 
Mainland China 31 24 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 
2000, 23 and 2004, 5. 
 
The two most efficient ways for 
countries to improve international com-
petitiveness is to continue utilizing the 
advantages offered by export orientation 
and FDI inflows and outflows. The share 
of goods exports as a proportion of 
GDP in Japan (dependent on its domestic 
market, though it is considered a merci-
less exporter in some markets and some 
product categories) remained at 10–12 
per cent over the 1996–2003 period. 
Shares in other countries with huge do-
mestic markets either rose considerably 
(Germany: 20–21 per cent; People’s 
China: 31 per cent), or decreased steadily 
(the United States from 10 to 6.5 per 
cent and the UK from 27 to 17 per 
cent). In the same period, all Asian 
economies reviewed and Germany im-
proved their current-account positions as 
proportions of GDP (Japan: 1.5 and 3.2 
per cent; Mainland China: 0.8 and 3.3 
per cent; Hong Kong: -1.0 and 10.2 per 
cent; Germany: -0.3 and 2.3 per cent). 
The current-account position worsened 
significantly in the United States (-1.8 
and –4.8 per cent) and to some extent 
in France (1.3 and 1.0 per cent) and the 
UK (0.1 and –1.7 per cent).5 
Inward direct investment stocks in 
Mainland China in 2003 surpassed USD 
500 billion, supplemented by USD 375 
billion in Hong Kong (United States USD 
1554 billion; UK USD 672 billion; Ger-
many USD 545 billion; France USD 434 
billion). Japan, with various liberalization 
and FDI-attraction schemes, continued to 
catch up (USD 90 billion). Some of the 
countries under review were very active 
in FDI exports. Direct investment stocks 
abroad in 2003 stood at USD 336 billion 
for Japan and for Hong Kong, and USD 
37 billion for People’s China (United 
States USD 2069 billion; UK USD 1129; 
France USD 643 billion; Germany USD 
622 billion; Netherlands USD 384 bil-
lion).6 
 The positions of the United States 
and People’s China in international com-
petitiveness were remarkable for a num-
ber of factors. But Table 6 shows that 
Japan, the leading Asian economy, ex-
celled only in accumulating gold and 
foreign exchange reserves (SDR 450 bil-
                                                 
5 IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 1997 
and 2004, and author’s calculations based on 
IMF International Financial Statistics 2000 and 
October 2004. 
6 UN World Investment Report, 2004. 
Table 4 
Export and import positions of selected 
countries, 2003 
 
 Exports, USD 
billion (%) 
Imports, USD 
billion (%) 
World 7530 (100.0) 7819 (100) 
United States 724 (9.6) 1305 (16.7) 
EU 15 2879 (38.2) 2788 (35.7) 
   France  386 (5.1) 390 (5.0) 
   Germany 742 (9.9) 596 (7.6) 
   UK 306 (4.1) 384 (4.9) 
Japan 474 (6.3) 383 (4.9) 
Mainland China 438 (5.8) 413 (5.3) 
Hong Kong 224 (3.0) 232 (3.0) 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Quar-
terly, September 2004.
  
8 
8
lion, highest in the world).7 The only 
other notable Japanese statistics here 
were the share of high-technology ex-
ports in its total manufactured exports 
(25 per cent). Survey data did not show 
it a big achiever either. 
2) MAIN TRENDS IN JAPAN’S 
TRADE AND FDI FLOWS 
Before making predictions about the fu-
ture in Japan’s external economic poli-
cies, it is advisable to study some basic 
historical trends. Japan’s share of world 
exports eased considerably in the last 
decade (from 9.6 per cent in 1993 to 
6.1 per cent in 2003), while those of the 
United States and the EU decreased 
much less (from 12.3 to 9.1 per cent 
and from 38.7 to 36.8 per cent respec-
tively). The only country surveyed where 
the import share grew was the United 
States (from 15.8 to 17.3 per cent). It 
virtually stagnated in the EU (from 36.8 
to 37.0 per cent) and lost relative weight 
in Japan (from 6.4 to 5.1 per cent).8 Ja-
pan suffered a huge loss of international 
position in FDI exports in 1990–2003 
(from 11.5 to 4.1 per cent) while its 
main rivals retained or increased shares 
that were twice to four times as great 
initially. The relative weight of Japan’s 
inward stock doubled, but remained 
modest compared with its competitors, 
whose shares did not change significantly 
(Table 7). 
Although Japan’s share of global 
trade decreased, it managed to retain its 
huge export surplus throughout the pe-
                                                 
7 Japan improved that position further to USD 
838 billion by the end of October 2004, the lat-
est figure available. 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/sk/data/skeall.pdf/.  
8 Author’s calculations based on IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2000 and 2003, and 
Quarterly, September 2004. 
riod under review. Its trade surplus be-
tween 1996 and 2003 was never less 
than USD 50 billion and in most years 
reached or even surpassed USD 100 bil-
lion (Table 8, Row 1). These annual sur-
pluses represented 15–30 per cent of its 
exports.  
The structure of this trade by main 
partners (Table 8) was remarkably stable 
on the export side. The Asian developing 
countries, the United States, and the EU 
all continued to account for outstanding, 
high and significant shares respectively. 
However, around the time of the South-
east Asian financial crisis in the middle 
of the period, Japanese exporters 
adapted fast to sluggish demand in 
Asian developing countries by increasing 
sales to the United States and the EU. 
Meanwhile the Chinese market (Mainland 
China and Hong Kong), not hit by the 
crisis, remained a voracious market for 
Japanese products, even increasing its 
share from 11 to 16 per cent after 
2000.  
Imports showed bigger changes. 
The US share declined steadily from 24 
to 17 per cent, while that of the Asian 
developing countries increased from 37 
to 44 per cent – above their share of 
Japan’s exports. Again, China was the 
striking performer (12 to 19 per cent) 
and overtook the United States. A modest 
increase in the share of the Middle East 
after 1999 might be explained by con-
siderations of oil-supply security. 
Table 9, Row 1, shows that Japan’s 
annual exports of FDI rose from the 
USD 23–26 billion range in the second 
half of the 1990s to USD 32–38 billion.9 
Western Europe has consistently held the 
greatest share since 1999, while Asia has 
also surpassed the United States. The 
trends reflect Japan’s endeavours to 
moderate its dependence on the United 
States, in favour of neighbouring Asian 
countries and the third pole, Western
                                                 
9 The 2003 figure of USD 29 billion remained 
close to latter range. UN World Investment Re-
port, 2004. 
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Table 6 
Selected factors for international competitiveness, 2002–4 
 
 
Total re-
serves: 
ranking 
(SDR bil-
lion) 
Tax reve-
nues as a 
proportion 
of GDP: 
ranking (%) 
Employees’ 
social secu-
rity contri-
butions as 
proportion 
of GDP p. 
c.: ranking 
(%) 
Exchange- 
rate policy 
and com-
pany com-
petitiveness: 
ranking 
(score)* 
Government 
subsidies to
firms as 
proportion 
of GDP: 
ranking (%)
Creation of 
firms hin-
dered or 
supported 
by legisla-
tion: rank-
ing (score)*
Investment 
incentives to 
foreign in-
vestors: 
ranking 
(score)* 
Total com-
pensation 
of manu-
facturing 
workers: 
ranking 
(USD/ 
hour) 
Average 
annual 
working 
time: rank-
ing (hours)
Attitudes 
toward 
globaliza-
tion: rank-
ing (score)*
 
Values of 
society sup-
porting 
competitive-
ness: rank-
ing (score)*
High-tech 
as a pro-
portion of 
manufactur-
ing exports: 
ranking (%) 
Japan 1 (447) 23 (27) 28 (15) 16 (6.1) 26 (0.8) 32 (5.9) 44 (4.8) 45 (20.3) 34 (1864) 20 (6.7) 32 (5.9) 14 (24.5) 
People’s China 2 (294) 12 (17) 1 (0) 10 (6.4) 27 (0.9) 23 (6.6) 13 (7.0) 5 (0.7) 23 (1958) 21 (6.7) 18 (6.6) 16 (23.3) 
United States 8 (60) 26 (29) 19 (9) 4 (6.8) 15 (0.4) 6 (7.8) 16 (6.8) 49 (21.3) 29 (1895) 23 (6.6) 2 (8.4) 7 (31.9) 
France 19 (24) 55 (44) 57 (51) 54 (3.4) 40 (1.3) 40 (5.3) 27 (6.2) 46 (20.8) 59 (1561) 56 (4.2) 56 (4.5) 20 (21.2) 
Germany 11 (38) 42 (36) 35 (21) 49 (4.2) 44 (1.5) 48 (4.6) 45 (4.8) 59 (30.0) 55 (1674) 29 (6.2) 49 (5.0) 29 (16.6) 
UK 15 (29) 39 (36) 20 (10) 43 (4.7) 16 (0.5) 35 (5.7) 28 (6.2) 44 (19.1) 38 (1787) 26 (6.4) 26 (6.2) 10 (31.4) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on various tables in IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2004, covering 51 countries in 9 regions. 
* Survey data given on a 0–10 scale of negative to positive perceptions. 
 
 
Table 7 
Japan’s international position in stock of FDI exports and imports, 1990–2002 
 
 Exports Imports 
 1990 2003 1990 2003 
 USD billion % USD million % USD billion % USD billion % 
World 1758.216 100 8196.863 100 1950.303 100 8245.074 100 
Japan 201.441 11.5 335500 4.1 9.850 0.5 89.729 1.1 
United States 430.521 24.5 2069.013 25.2 394.911 20.2 1553.955 18.8 
EU 797.102 45.3 4035.610 49.2 795.808 40.8 3335.454 40.5 
Source: UN World Investment Report, 2004. 
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Table 8 
The partner structure of Japanese foreign trade, %, 1996–2002 
 
 Exports Imports 
Partner 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
World, USD billion = 100 411.3 421.1 388.0 419.2 478.2 403.4 416.6 349.6 338.6 280.8 310.7 380.5 349.1 337.1 
United States 27.5 28.1 30.9 31.1 30.1 30.4 28.8 22.9 22.4 24.0 21.7 19.1 18.3 17.4 
EU 15.4 15.6 18.5 17.8 16.4 16.0 14.7 14.2 13.4 14.0 13.8 12.3 12.8 13.0 
Australia & New Zealand 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.8 5.0 5.3 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.7 
Asian developing 44.1 42.2 34.8 37.4 41.3 40.1 43.2 37.7 37.2 37.2 39.9 41.9 42.5 43.6 
China & Hong Kong (11.5) (11.6) (11.0) (10.9) (12.0) (13.4) (15.7) (12.3) (13.0) (13.8) (14.4) (15.0) (17.0) (18.7) 
European developing* 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 
Middle East 2.6 2.7 3.5 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.9 10.1 11.3 9.1 9.9 13.0 12.7 12.1 
Latin America 4.1 4.7 5.0 4.3 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.6 
Other 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.4 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.4 4.8 4.9 5.2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2003. * Including all post-Soviet states. 
 
Table 9 
Regional distribution of Japan’s exports of FDI, %, 1995–2003 
 
Destination 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003* 
World, USD million = 100 22,630 23,428 25,993 24,151 22,743 31,556 38,333 32,280 12,456 
Asia 37.6 41.6 50.5 32.5 8.6 6.9 20.4 25.3 20.6 
People’s China 14.2 9.9 7.2 5.4 1.6 3.0 5.6 8.1 10.4 
Hong Kong 1.5 4.7 6.8 3.3 -0.7 0.4 1.3 0.7 1.3 
ASEAN 17.7 22.4 29.9 18.7 4.9 0.7 10.5 13.2 6.0 
United States 39.3 47.3 28.4 23.5 31.2 44.7 18.5 23.5 26.7 
Latin America NA -6.0 9.0 23.4 24.2 12.6 11.3 12.6 14.2 
Oceania NA 3.0 1.1 5.9 0.2 0.9 1.7 4.4 3.3 
Western Europe 14.8 12.1 9.6 9.2 36.1 34.7 46.7 30.2 31.3 
Eastern Europe NA 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.9 
Middle East NA 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.5 -0.1 0 0.3 -0.2 
Africa NA -0.5 0.5 1.4 0.9 -0.6 -0.5 0.7 2.1 
Other 8.6 1.0 -0.3 2.8 -2.3 0.4 1.7 2.6 0.1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Regional Balance of Payments, Bank of Japan, Ministry of Finance (www.mof.go.jp/bop), and IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2003. * First half. 
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Europe or the EU. Another development 
worth mentioning has been the stabiliza-
tion of Latin America’s share at 12–14 
per cent by the end of the period under 
review. (The relationship with free-trade 
agreements such as NAFTA and pact 
mooted between Japan and Mexico are 
mentioned in the next chapter.) 
Special attention needs paying to in-
tra-regional changes among the Asian 
countries. People’s China showed a 
steady decrease between 1995 and 1999, 
followed by a steady increase, but to-
gether with Hong Kong, it only sur-
passed the combined share of the ASEAN 
countries in 2000 and in the first half 
of 2003. (Except in the first half of 
2003, Eastern Europe hardly reached 1 
per cent, with a relative weight of 0.5 
per cent throughout the period.) 
3) PROBABLE TRENDS IN JA-
PAN’S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC 
POLICIES 
Japan’s social and economic changes in 
the last decade were parts of a trans-
formation process, bringing it increas-
ingly into line with international macro 
development and micro business models, 
without losing its precious cultural and 
other traditions. There had been earlier 
efforts to cut back state intervention in 
the economy, notably during the pre-
mierships of Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 
1980s, when ‘planning’ was almost 
erased from the vocabulary of economic 
policy-making. But by the end of the 
1990s, there were more telling signs of 
this.10 
                                                 
10 Two rather general, but revealing statistics are 
the share of the public sector in total employ-
ment and that of public expenditure in GDP. The 
former in 1999 was 3.2 per cent in Japan, but 
6.1 per cent in Italy (with about half the popula-
tion). The latter proportion increased in Japan 
Loss of importance and prestige by 
the hitherto mighty Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) and 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) had become 
apparent by the end of the 1990s.11 A 
huge change in the system of govern-
ment administration was introduced on 
January 6, 2001, at a cost of some USD 
400 million dollars. Files and workplaces 
of 33,000 employees were moved and 
the number of ministries and agencies 
cut from 22 to 12 plus a Cabinet Of-
fice.12 
As foreign investors become more 
prominent in industry and domestic 
trade and market forces spread through 
the financial sector, the scope for admin-
istrative intervention or ‘guidance’ has 
narrowed. Even Keidanren, the organiza-
tion that acts as spokesman for the big-
gest corporations, plays a much smaller 
role than it did. One possible explanation 
for all this may be the advance of the 
so-called IT revolution. 
The number of ‘scenarios’ and ‘vi-
sions’ put forward by the public sector 
has decreased considerably, while initia-
tives in this field by the private sector 
have become stronger. A Keidanren 
document about long-term prospects, for 
example, predicts a stronger global atti-
tude in Japan.13 The thrust of Japanese 
                                                                          
from 35% in 1993 to 38% in 2003, while in Italy 
it eased from 56 to 48 per cent. OECD figures 
cited in Magyar Hírlap, September 19, 2003, p. 
2, and The Economist, March 20, 2004, 114. 
11 After relinquishing its almost daily handling of 
the banking sector, the MoF was no longer al-
lowed to devise the state budget either. Funda-
mental figures and ratios are now formulated by 
a new council under the prime minister’s Cabinet 
Office (The Economist, January 9, 2001, 51.) 
12 Government officials stressed efficiency rather 
than cost-cutting when justifying the changes. 
Shigeki Suzuki, responsible for reorganizing the 
hitherto independent Ministry of Post and Tele-
communications, hoped, for example, that pass-
ports and driving licences could soon be issued 
at post offices (Nikkei Weekly, December 4, 
2000, p. 3). 
13 Japan 2025: Envisioning a vibrant, attractive 
nation in the twenty-first century. Tokyo: Nippon 
Keidanren, Japan Business Federation, Keizai Koho 
Center, 2003. 
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knowledge and technologies will move 
from the domestic economy to the inter-
national arena, while a ‘free economic 
sphere’ will emerge in East Asia under 
Japanese leadership. It is also worth not-
ing how the document the economy to 
be based on ‘a self-regulating economic 
system driven by the private sector and 
market concerns’.14 Keidanren itself is 
foreseen as ‘a bridge between the private 
and public sectors’, based not on a close 
relationship with the administration, but 
on ‘rivalry with the Japanese govern-
ment’.15 The organization sees multilateral 
and bilateral trade agreements as the 
institutional framework for economic co-
operation not only in the East Asian re-
gion, but globally, as means of regional 
economic development based on free 
movement of goods, people, services, 
capital and information, solving global 
problems that endanger progress in the 
region. In Keidanren’s view, Japan does 
not see the emerging East Asian econo-
mies as threats, but as supplementary 
forces, although Japan should reassure 
these countries that it will remain open 
to their investments, goods and immi-
grants.16 
The wording reflects mounting 
pressure from some of the Japanese pri-
vate sector for looser immigration con-
trols. Ageing of the population points to 
the need to ease (structural) shortage of 
labour.17 So Japan can obviously be ex-
pected to open its doors gradually to 
immigrants, especially nurses to take 
care of the elderly and technicians 
(mainly from China and India) capable 
of performing routine computer-related 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 4. 
15 Ibid., 12. 
16 Ibid., 9. 
17 Japan’s population is expected to peak at 128 
million in 2007 and then shrink rapidly. At pre-
sent, there are some four active earners for each 
pensioner, but by 2025, there will only be 2.2. 
Taxes and welfare payments, now 36 per cent of 
GDP, will exceed 60 per cent by 2025 (The 
Economist, July 1, 2000, 28). 
tasks.18 A perhaps far-fetched UN esti-
mate holds that Japan will need an an-
nual 600,000 immigrants to cover its 
labour demand.19 Behind such estimates 
lie obvious considerations: certain activi-
ties and services cannot be exported, as 
the demand for them appears domesti-
cally. For example, mounting unwilling-
ness to take jobs like caring for the eld-
erly and similar low-prestige tasks is in-
creasing the need for foreign labour. 
The outsourcing of some call services 
and software tasks will take place in 
parallel. 
The Japanese economy will have a 
growing need for foreign investors, not 
because of shortage of capital – the 
country has huge foreign-exchange re-
serves – but for the beneficial effects of 
new competitors and the transfer of for-
eign management methods. Here, how-
ever, the Japanese External Trade Or-
ganization (JETRO) comments self-critically, 
‘Japan must develop the type of domestic 
environment that attracts foreign capital 
and human resources.’ This certainly re-
lates to the methods of Japanese gov-
ernment.20 
                                                 
18 A first hesitant step was taken toward opening 
the labor market in November 2004, when Japan 
and the Philippines agreed the principles of an 
economic partnership agreement (EPA), under 
which both would select candidates in the Philip-
pines among nurses and health care workers 
who were certified there. Those selected would 
enter Japan with special visas and be required to 
take Japanese language training for six months. 
Their stays in Japan, however, would be limited 
to about four years, but workers acquiring 
Japanese qualifications would be allowed to ex-
tend their visas every three years. However, the 
sensitive decision on the maximum number of 
such workers Japan would admit was shelved 
and the final pact was not expected to include 
an annual figure either (Nikkei Weekly, Novem-
ber 22, 2004, 1 and 7.) 
19 New York Times, September 23, 2001, 18. 
20 White paper on international trade and for-
eign direct investment. Summary. Tokyo: JETRO, 
2003, 39. 
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4) ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS 
AND FREE-TRADE AGREE-
MENTS21 
Japan, like other highly industrialized 
countries, has been asserting its global 
interests mainly through GATT and then 
WTO membership. In a tripolar world 
economy, however, Japan has developed 
a stronger interest in regional coopera-
tion schemes, such as ASEAN, PAFTA, APEC, 
the EAEC, PECC and AFTA,22 although it 
continues to emphasize its preference for 
‘open’ as opposed to ‘bloc-type’ regional-
ism.23 In view of the failure or limited 
success of such schemes, Japan began at 
the end of the 1990s to turn to other 
means such as bilateral free-trade 
agreements. 
                                                 
21 The former (EPAs) are vehicles for wider eco-
nomic cooperation, including services, labour and 
capital movements, standards, royalties, environ-
mental and other fields, and even harmonization 
of government policy. The latter (FTAs) are de-
signed simply for removing tariff (and non-tariff) 
barriers to trade. For more detail, see Jung Sung 
Chun, ‘Japan’s policy for an East Asian FTA and 
Korea’s response’, Korea Focus, July-August 
2004, 141–56. 
22 ASEAN – Association of South-East Asian Na-
tions. PAFTA – Pacific Free Trade Area. APEC – 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. EAEC – East-
Asian Economic Caucus. PECC – Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference. AFTA – ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement. 
23 With regard to RTAs, the WTO has ruled out 
the creation of discriminatory arrangements by 
referring to the concept of ‘open regionalism’. It 
changes the interpretation of most-favoured na-
tion (MFN) from exclusive MFN required from 
members only, which is the GATT norm, to inclu-
sive MFN (also for non-members). It also changes 
the norm of reciprocity from specific direct bal-
ancing of benefits to more diffuse and general 
give and take. See ‘WTO obligation and outward 
orientation of RTAs’. In: Meeting the challenges 
in an era of globalization by strengthening re-
gional development cooperation. New York: UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific, 2004, 43. The same source cites APEC 
as an example of open regionalism (Ibid, 45.) 
In a peculiar way, the Japanese 
government has been continuously influ-
enced in the same direction by the in-
flexibly protectionist behaviour of domes-
tic business circles. Its policy considera-
tion was to confront them, especially the 
agricultural lobby, with huge Japanese 
manufacturing corporations and trading 
houses operating on a global scale, 
which would have strong interests in free 
trade and in keeping up with rivals.24 
For these mainly transnational companies 
have realized that processes towards re-
gionalism in the world (such as NAFTA in 
North America and the EU in Europe) 
may crowd them out of significant com-
modity and capital markets or face them 
with latecomers’ disadvantages. FTAs, on 
the other hand, have pressed competition 
on Japan and so given momentum to 
domestic structural changes continually 
called for in business at home and 
abroad. At the same time, priority is 
clearly being given to neighbouring East 
and Southeast Asian countries in the se-
quence of agreements being concluded.25 
This recognition gained poignancy 
after the 1997–8 financial crisis in 
Southeast Asia,26 when thorough study of 
                                                 
24 The biggest were car companies (Toyota, Nis-
san, Suzuki, Honda, Mazda), manufacturers of 
electrical and electronic equipment (Matsushita, 
Toshiba, Sony, Sharp, Fujitsu, NEC), and the sogo 
shosha or general trading firms (Mitsubishi, Mit-
sui, Sumitomo, Nissho-Iwai, etc.) 
25 According to some observers, negotiations with 
Mexico, for example, were otherwise going quite 
well until deliberately slowed down, so that it 
would not become the first FTA deal with a 
country from outside the region. Preferential 
treatment for the region, according to the politi-
cal scientist Professor Takashi Inoguchi of Tokyo 
University, should be seen even in the creation of 
a post of state minister in charge of East Asian 
affairs, who retains the rank of deputy prime 
minister (Nikkei Weekly, December 22, 2003, 
37). Most recently, Prime Minister Junichiro Koi-
zumi announced on December 20, 2004 that he 
would himself take on the role of coordinating 
ministries to promote EPA talks (Ibid., December 
27, 2004–January 3, 2005, 6). 
26 The after-effects of this crisis were the subject 
of a study at the Japan East and Southeast Asia 
Research Centre: Artner, Annamária, András 
Hernádi, Klára Mészáros and András Székely-
Doby (1998), The Far Eastern region: moving be-
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the chances for regional and bilateral 
trade agreements began also at MITI.27 
This was undoubtedly helped by the fact 
that strong opposition from the United 
States and China had thwarted Japan’s 
attempt to establish an Asian Monetary 
Fund. It therefore had to be satisfied 
with bilateral forms of rendering finan-
cial aid to countries in crisis.28 
Figure 1 summarizes the framework 
in which the author sees Japan’s global, 
regional and bilateral trade and FDI 
policies being pursued. It shows Japan 
seeking appropriate responses to chal-
lenges that appear on three different lev-
els. 
(i) On a global level, Japan has striven 
for a seat on the UN Security Coun-
cil and long been the main financial 
contributor to the UNDP, and 
through its global network of embas-
sies and JETRO and JICA (Japan Inter-
national Cooperation Agency) offices, 
it also represents the interests of its 
private sector, from huge transna-
tionals down to small and medium-
sized firms. In addition, Japan has 
                                                                          
yond an atmosphere of crisis. Working Papers 91. 
Budapest: IWE.  
27 Since renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI). 
28 Under the Miyazawa Initiative (named after 
the then minister of finance), all in all some US$ 
30 billion has been made available to Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea. 
been recognized as a leading supply 
of aid, in terms of absolute volume 
provided.29  
(ii) On a regional level, Japan has played 
a lead in the Asian Development 
Bank and Asian Pacific Economic Co-
operation forum, initiated and ‘oper-
ated’ ASEAN + 3 (summit and lower-
level meetings of 10 ASEAN members 
plus Japan, China and Korea), pro-
moted, as mentioned, the idea of an 
Asian Monetary Fund, and supported 
several other regional schemes. It 
signed, for example, a joint declara-
tion on the Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (CEP) between ASEAN and 
Japan on Novem-
ber 5, 2002, pro-
viding for early 
measures to realize 
economic coopera-
tion, including 
elements of a pos-
sible free trade 
area within ten 
years.30 After-
wards, at Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s 
meeting with ASEAN 
leaders in Djakarta 
on September 4, 
2004, they agreed 
on a deadline of 
March 2007 for an EPA. Two of the 
most recent schemes for regional co-
operation, the East Asian Summit 
(EAS) meetings and East Asian Com-
munity (EAC),31 are aimed at a free-
trade area, financial cooperation and 
a security pact. These are the types 
explicitly intended to offset the in-
                                                 
29 For a longer analysis, see Hernádi, András 
(2003), Japan’s ODA policies. Budapest: IWE, 
mimeo. 
30 See Sen, R. (2004), Free trade agreements in 
Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia Background Series 
I. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
78. 
31 See, for instance, ‘East Asian diplomacy: Yan-
kee stay home’, The Economist, December 11, 
2004, 50. 
Figure 1 
The main frames of Japan’s external economic relations: 
trade, investment, finance 
 
GLOBAL SCHEMES: JAPANESE RESPONSES: 
UN, WTO, World Bank, IMF UNDP, JETRO, JICA 
REGIONAL SCHEMES: 
 
ADB, APEC, ASEAN + 3 RTAs* Summits, ‘AMF’, FTAs?, Yen bloc?
BILATERAL SCHEMES 
 
PTAs**, FTAs FTAs, EPAs 
* As of July 2003, only three WTO members (Macao China, Mongolia 
and Taiwan were not party to at least one RTA. ** Preferential trade 
agreements. *** Economic partnership agreements. 
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creasing importance of the European 
and North American regional blocs in 
the world economy. Later, a chal-
lenge to Japan’s external economic 
policy might be posed by South 
American blocs or even a single Pan-
American bloc. The South American 
Community of Nations (SACN) is a 
regional trade accord signed in Peru 
on December 8, 2004, between the 
member-countries of MERCOSUR and 
the Andean Community. But it has 
yet left so many issues open that it 
has rightly been described as a loose, 
long-term project, only tangential to 
intra-regional trade.32 Thus, the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 
a hemispheric scheme much pro-
moted by the United States, seems to 
be even more far-fetched at present. 
The special, inter-regional cases 
that link regionalism to global scenes 
are also worth considering. The ASEM 
(Asia-Europe Meetings) Dialogue, ini-
tiated by France and Singapore in 
the 1990s, also enjoys Japan’s active 
support.33 New elements in this in-
clude the submission of a report on 
October 8, 2004 by the ASEM Task 
Force for Closer Economic Partner-
ship (CEP) to the ASEM meeting in 
Hanoi.34 This calls for more ‘rational 
and beneficial’ use of Asian savings, 
to reduce ASEM members’ ‘potentially 
destabilizing over-dependence on the 
US dollar’, enhance international use 
of the euro, and create a more bal-
anced international monetary system. 
It was also recommended that ASEM 
leaders should take the initiative to 
create a regional bond market in 
                                                 
32 See, for instance, ‘South American unity still a 
distant dream’, Financial Times, December 9, 
2004, 4. 
33 The ASEM process is reviewed by the author at 
greater length in a Hungarian-language paper in 
the Műhelytanulmányok (Workshop studies) series 
No. 23. Budapest: IWE. 
34 At the same meeting, all the ten new EU 
countries were admitted into ASEM, making it a 
more comprehensive inter-regional forum. 
East Asia, using a basket ‘YES’ (yen–
euro–US dollar) basket of curren-
cies.35 Clearly by 2020, however, the 
Chinese yuan (renminbi) will have to 
be playing a similar role in such a 
basket if China keeps increasing its 
share of world trade, especially in 
trade in Asia. Two minor news items 
about relations between Japan and 
Europe are interesting in this respect. 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroe-
der remarked on a recent trip to 
Tokyo that Europe could learn from 
the interventionist Bank of Japan. 
Meanwhile a senior Japanese finance 
ministry official said that Japan and 
the euro zone authorities were dis-
cussing the prospect of joint interven-
tion if the yen and the euro contin-
ued to strengthen against the dol-
lar.36 
(iii) On the bilateral level, Japan started 
its series of FTAs with Singapore, as 
the most developed of its partners in 
the region, and as it had no agricul-
tural products to be afraid of. For 
the same reason, the Ministry of Ag-
riculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
(MAFF), representing the agricultural 
lobby in Japan, has preferred multi-
lateral agreements over bilateral ones, 
because the preparation process takes 
longer. Representatives of sectors that 
appear protectionist at multilateral 
negotiations may promote bilateral 
agreements that do not impinge on 
their sector’s imports. 
The Japan-Singapore Economic Part-
nership Agreement (JSEPA), which came 
into force on November 30, 2002, 
brought a number of advances. (1) It 
eliminated tariffs on goods accounting 
for 98.5 per cent of current trade. (2) 
It committed both countries to improve 
the speed and efficiency of mutual cus-
                                                 
35 ‘Asia quietly seeks to move out from under 
U.S. dollar’, Nikkei Weekly, November 29, 2004, 
39. 
36 International Herald Tribune, December 11-12, 
2004, 4; Financial Times, December 11-12, 24. 
  
16 
16
toms clearance of goods and replace pa-
per-based trade documents with more 
cost-effective electronic versions. (3) It 
increased vastly the commitments by both 
countries to liberalize and facilitate 
transactions in the services sector, with 
special regard to tourism, ICT, the me-
dia and broadcasting, and finances. (4) 
It guaranteed each other’s citizens entry 
and work permits and administration of 
their investments under liberal conditions. 
(5) It contained detailed provisions on 
investment promotion and protection. It 
also promotes mutual recognition and 
cooperation in competition policy, pro-
vides procedures and regulations for 
government procurement, initiates col-
laboration and cooperation on intellectual 
property, enhances cooperation in sci-
ence, technology and human resources, 
and offers orderly settlement of dis-
putes.37  
Negotiations with Mexico and Ko-
rea were more problematic for both 
sides. Those with Mexico have pro-
foundly illustrated the strong interests 
and counter-interests behind the FTAs. 
Japanese manufacturing companies, by a 
NAFTA regulation of 2001, were stripped 
of the tax-free status that they enjoyed 
as component suppliers under the so-
called Maquiladora Programme so long 
as assembly was followed by re-export – 
mainly to the United States. This made 
these Japanese companies very keen to 
see an FTA between Japan and Mexico.38 
However, strong doubts have also been 
aired. Japanese agricultural producers, 
with their traditionally protected posi-
tions, were obviously resistant to an FTA 
with Mexico once they knew that similar 
treaties were in the offing with countries 
much closer to Japan.39 (Similar consid-
                                                 
37 Sen (2004), 27–32. 
38 Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and In-
dustry estimated that the absence of such an FTA 
lost them USD 3.7 billion in annual profits and 
32,000 jobs (Nikkei Weekly, December 15, 2003, 
6). 
39 Fukushiro Nukaga, Chairman of the Council 
on FTA-related Affairs and a leading governing-
party politician, clearly aimed to dispel such 
erations led to a few products being ex-
cepted from the tax-free category in the 
FTA with Singapore.) After sorting out, 
or rather postponing solution of a num-
ber of issues regarding imports by Japan 
of pork and orange juice, and by Mex-
ico of cars and steel products, the 
agreement was signed on September 17, 
2004, with implementation postponed un-
til April 2005. So, notwithstanding some 
limitations, Japanese businesses became 
entitled to take part in public procure-
ment opportunities for which a precondi-
tion was an FTA between Mexico and 
the partner country.40 
The obstacles to an FTA with Korea 
are similar. There are additional prob-
lems, such as historical tensions between 
the two countries, although the atmos-
phere was improved somewhat by the 
two countries’ success in planning, coor-
dinating and hosting the 2002 World 
Cup Soccer Championship. The main 
economic consideration hindering the ne-
gotiations is protectionism initiated by 
less competitive Korean sectors.41 The 
general fear on Korea’s side is that its 
trade deficit with Japan will grow con-
siderably, if and when import tariffs are 
abolished, as exports of Korean manu-
factures already face almost no duties at 
all.42 To sum up, the fate of the agree-
ment will depend on the interest shown 
by Japanese companies in investing in 
Korea. Rivalry between the two countries 
– Korea’s endeavours to compete inter-
nationally with Japan in more and more 
fields – will also emerge in the final 
stages of the negotiation process. One 
                                                                          
anxieties when he said Japan should consider 
compensating farmers who lost by FTAs con-
cluded with Asian countries (Nikkei Weekly, De-
cember 15, 2003, 6). 
40 Nikkei Weekly, September 20, 2004, 5. 
41 This is the opinion of Jwa Sung-hee, president 
of the Korean Economic Research Institute, cited 
in Nikkei Weekly, September 15, 2003, 29. 
42 At the time of writing, Korean goods in Japan 
met average tariffs of 2.7 per cent, while Japa-
nese goods in Korea met average tariffs of 9.2 
per cent (Nikkei Weekly, October 27, 2003, 44). 
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might go so far as to say that strong 
Korean nationalism and a possible 
change in the relationship between the 
two Koreas might equally have a signifi-
cant influence on the outcome in the 
opposite direction.43 
Concluding an FTA with Korea 
could bring closer a trilateral trade 
agreement with People’s China, as 
mooted in the communiqué by the three 
leaders after a meeting in Bali on Octo-
ber 8, 2003.44 (There Japan and the 10 
ASEAN countries also signed a framework 
agreement on economic cooperation, 
holding out the prospect of a regional 
FTA among them.) Bilateral FTA negotia-
tions with Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia continue with expectations of 
being concluded in 2005. They are likely 
to be followed by FTAs with Indonesia 
and People’s China.45 Apart from similar 
agricultural problems, the sensitive issue 
with Thailand and the Philippines is lib-
eralization of the Japanese labour mar-
ket. (Both countries would like freer ac-
cess there for their doctors and medical 
assistants.) Malaysia, in turn, would like 
to retain a kind of infant-industry status 
for its car manufacturing. 
The Nikkei Weekly, Japan’s influen-
tial business periodical in English, carried 
a front-page article on how Japan would 
start a strong campaign to conclude fur-
                                                 
43 The process might also be influenced indirectly 
by the FTA Korea concluded with Chile in Febru-
ary 2004, although Chile is far smaller and 
more remote (The Economist, February 28, 2004, 
59). 
44 Nikkei Weekly, October 13, 2003, 2 and 28. 
45 The Osaka-based business lobby, which in-
cludes the CEOs of Matsushita Electric, Sanyo 
Electric, Sharp and other corporations, seems to 
be the most enthusiastic advocate for such an 
FTA between Japan and China. COFCO, China’s 
top food trader, is also promoting the idea. Its 
president, Liu Fuchun, said, ‘Many wealthy Chi-
nese would buy Japanese rice even if they had to 
pay 10 times the price of Chinese rice.’ See 
‘Unlikely voices may back FTA with China’, Nik-
kei Weekly, July 5, 2004, 32. However, the 
United States is apparently ‘trying to deter Japan 
and China from entering into a FTA,’ which may 
add an extra dimension to the issue. (See, for 
instance, Nikkei Weekly, June 7, 2004, 22). 
ther EPAs and FTAs.46 The main points 
made there seem to offer an effective 
way of concluding what has been said in 
this paper and showing the likely priori-
ties in Japan’s choice of partners for 
such agreements, up to the end of the 
decade. ‘Looking to move the free trade 
process forward, the Japanese govern-
ment aims by 2010 to ink economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) with at 
least ten nations and regions, including 
China, Brazil and Australia. Tokyo… 
seeks to reach agreements with countries 
and regions with high growth potential 
or a wealth of natural resources… The 
government is also preparing to launch 
talks next year with the entire Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations. The gov-
ernment is looking to strengthen eco-
nomic ties through the EPAs and use 
them to promote domestic structural re-
forms… Bolstering ties with the emerging 
so-called BRIC economies – Brazil, Russia, 
India and China – is seen as a pressing 
issue… In Asia, the government is study-
ing potential agreements with China… 
Australia is seen as a likely candidate 
because it would provide a stable supply 
of natural resources. South Africa, Chile 
and Middle Eastern countries are emerg-
ing as possible candidates for EPA part-
nership, according to informed sources.’ 
The article was accompanied by a re-
vealing table showing pros and cons for 
the countries and regions discussed: 
 
                                                 
46 ‘Tokyo ramps up EPA talks, eyes at least 10 
by 2010.’ Nikkei Weekly, September 6, 2004, 1 
and 7. 
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However, an editorial in the same 
newspaper a few weeks later called at-
tention to some inherent problems: ‘To-
kyo’s FTA bids have been hobbled by 
uncoordinated and cumbersome policy-
making. The Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry is pressing trade partners 
to open their markets to Japanese indus-
trial products. At the same time, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries is doing everything in its power 
to protect domestic farmers from 
cheaper imports. And the Foreign Minis-
try is not doing its job as policy coordi-
nator. This situation can only be changed 
by centralizing policy-making, vesting a 
single minister with the authority to 
oversee and coordinate trade policy from 
a strategic perspective. Without a clear 
leader for this mission, Japan could well 
suffer a costly defeat in the FTA 
stakes.’47    
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
47 ‘Lack of leadership handicap in FTA race’, 
Nikkei Weekly, September 27, 2004, 28. 
Table 10
Candidate countries/regions for future EPA talks 
 
Country/region Expected results Problems 
China Would contribute to forming East 
Asian community. Japan would help 
China develop intellectual property 
protection and other systems. 
Tariff cuts will have serious impact on 
agricultural, forestry and fisheries 
products for both countries. China 
urged to first steadily implement inter-
national rules. 
India Expanded business opportunities for 
Japanese firms. Liberalization would 
have significant effect on this high-
tariff country. 
Tariff reduction would have serious 
impact on some industries in Japan, 
e.g. textiles. Uncertainty about possibil-
ity of high-level EPA. 
MERCOSUR (including 
Brazil) 
Opportunity to strengthen relationship 
with Latin America as a whole. 
Serious impact on agricultural, forestry 
and fisheries producers in Japan. 
Australia Significant for securing resources. See above, as for MERCOSUR (Brazil). 
Middle East (includ-
ing Saudi Arabia) 
Help in securing resources, including 
crude oil, in long term. 
Limited effect on trade. 
Chile Significant for securing resources. See above, as for MERCOSUR (Brazil). 
South Africa Beachhead to African market. Weak economic ties with Japan. 
Source: Nikkei Financial Daily, as cited by Nikkei Weekly, September 6, 2004, 1. 
